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Abstract
In this article we investigate with a case study from chemistry
under what conditions a simulation can serve as a surrogate for an
experiment. We set out with a brief discussion of the similarities and
differences between simulations and experiments. There are three fun-
damental differences: 1) Ability (of experiments) to gather new em-
pirical data. 2) Ability to operate directly on the target system. 3)
Ability to empirically test fundamental hypotheses. Given that there
are such fundamental differences it becomes an important question if
and under what conditions simulations can still act as surrogate for
experiments.
We investigate this question by analysing a simulation of H2-
formation in outer space. We find that in this case the simulation can
act as a surrogate for an experiment, because there exists comprehen-
sive theoretical background knowledge about the range of phenomena
to which the investigated process belongs and because any particular
modelling assumptions as, for example, on the validity of approxi-
mations, can be justified. If these requirements are met then direct
empirical validation of a “virtual experiment” may even be dispensable.
We conjecture that in the absence of comprehensive theoretical back-
ground knowledge direct empirical validation of “virtual experiments”
remains unavoidable.
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1 Introduction
Since computer simulations have caught the attention of philosophers of sci-
ence, there are ongoing debates concerning their ontological status [Bar-
berousse et al. , 2009], their function in science and their epistemic reach
[Humphreys, 2004], whether they are a novelty or merely introduce a more
powerful but not essentially different form of modeling [Frigg & Reiss, 2009,
Humphreys, 2009], how they affect scientific practice [Winsberg, 2010] and
how they are related to other tools of science like “Gedankenexperimente” on
the one hand or “material” experiments on the other hand.
In this paper we pick up the debate whether simulations are experiments.
This debate appears to have reached a stalemate: The arguments pro and
contra have been exchanged [Guala, 2002, Morgan, 2003, Morrison, 2009,
Parker, 2009, Winsberg, 2009] and obvious misunderstandings have been clar-
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ified, but no universally accepted solution has been reached. We believe that
this stalemate is in part due to the nature of the question. For, given that
simulations and experiments have some features in common but also differ in
certain respects, the answer to the question depends on whether the common
features or the differences are considered essential, which ultimately depends
on the point of view of the philosopher investigating the question.
However, because experiments play a very distinctive role in science, the
question is too important to be left just at that. In order to break the
stalemate, we therefore suggest shifting the emphasis of this question. Quite
frequently simulations are used in situations where experiments are not fea-
sible for practical or ethical reasons. Instead of asking the question whether
these simulations are truly experiments, we should ask:
1. Under what conditions can a simulation serve as a surrogate for an
experiment?
2. What requirements must be met so that the results of a simulation are
at least as reliable as the the results of an analogous experiment would
be?
We will investigate this question with a case study from theoretical chem-
istry, the simulation of H2-formation in outer space on the basis of quantum-
mechanics [Goumans & Kästner, 2010]. Different aspects of the simulation
process will be discussed with respect to the epistemic reliability of the sim-
ulation. We identify the existence of comprehensive and empirically well-
confirmed background theories as a crucial requirement for the reliability of
simulations of experimentally inaccessible phenomena.
2 Similarities and Differences between Simula-
tions and Experiments
The debate whether simulations are experiments is motivated by the fact
that simulations and experiments have many important features in common.
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In the following, we will briefly highlight the most important common fea-
tures and differences between simulations and experiments. Although we
cannot enter into all details of the debate here,1 it will become apparent
that despite many similarities some crucial differences between simulations
and experiments remain which set them apart with respect to their possible
epistemic role in science.
2.1 Similarities of Simulations and Experiments
One obvious reason why computer simulations are often labeled as “com-
puter experiments” is that the process of designing, setting up, running and
evaluating a simulation is by its very appearance quite similar to that of
designing, setting up, running and evaluating an experiment. Both simula-
tions and experiment share the same structure: They operate on an object
to learn something about a target system. With object we mean the entity
on which a computer simulation or an experiment operates. With target sys-
tem we mean that entity in nature that we want to learn something about
with a simulation or an experiment. The object must in some way or the
other be representative of the target system. In the case of an experiment,
however, the object can also be an instance of the target system itself, while
in a simulation the object is always a representation of the target system.2
Both simulations and experiments run in a controlled environment and
both allow interventions on the object [Parker, 2009, p. 487]. In simulations
the same tools are applied that were formerly thought of as typical for ex-
perimental data analysis like visualisation, statistics, data mining [Winsberg,
1A more detailed refutation of the arguments against the separation between simula-
tions and experiments will be published separately Arnold [2013]. A criticism that is simi-
lar in spirit as the one given there, has been formulated by Peschard [2012 forthcomming].
Here we largely confine ourselves to setting out the positive reasons for distinguishing
between simulations and experiments.
2Mary S. Morgan [2003] introduces a distinction between being a representative of and
being a representation of to describe this difference. The term representative in contrast
to representation is reserved by her for those cases where the object under study is either
identical or an instance of the target system. A very similar distinction is suggested by
Guala [2002] and picked up, though not endorsed by Winsberg [2009]. Emphasizing the
relation to the target rather than the role of the object, Guala speaks of material similarity
and formal similarity.
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2010, p. 33]. This includes similar techniques of error management for sim-
ulations and experiments. Among these are: Validation of the set-up (or the
apparatus) against cases with known results, testing for the responsiveness
on interventions, replicating the results under slightly different conditions,
testing for the conformance of the results with undisputed theoretical and
phenomenological background knowledge. Also, simulations just as experi-
ments allow us to learn something new and potentially surprising about their
object and, if the object is truely representative of the target system, also
about the target system itself.
Further shared characteristics between simulation and experimental prac-
tice are mentioned in the literature. It suffices to summarize them here: 1)
the “constant concern for uncertainty and error” [Winsberg, 2010, p. 34],
2) that simulations – just like experiments according to Hacking [Hacking,
1983] – “have a life of their own” and are in part “self-vindicating” [Winsberg,
2010, p. 45], 3) that simulations and experiments share the same challenge
of bridging the gap between their object and the target system, or, as one
might also say, between the experimental set-up and the real world outside
the experiment [Arnold, 2008, p. 174/175].
2.2 Differences between Simulations and Experiments
It would be rather surprising if despite these similarities there were no differ-
ences between simulations and experiments. For, if there were no substantial
differences why would people still invest large sums into highly sophisticated
experimental set-ups like that of a particle collider when they could just
as well buy a super computer? Some philosophers believe that it is rather
difficult to draw a sharp line between simulations and experiments [Morri-
son, 2009, Parker, 2009, Winsberg, 2010], but we believe there are at least
three fundamental differences between simulations and experiments which
are highly relevant for the epistemic status of either category.
First of all, experiments can provide us with new empirical data, com-
puter simulations cannot. While it is true that computer simulations deliver
results that may not have been known or expected by us beforehand, com-
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puter simulations can by their very nature only produce results that are
implied by the premises on which the simulation is built. It is important
here to understand the difference between a) things that are not logically
implied in our prior knowledge, b) things that are logically implied in our
prior knowledge but unknown to us and c) things that are logically implied
in our prior knowledge and also known to us. For category a, simulations
cannot help us; only experiments can help. For category b, simulations and
experiments can help us. And for category c, neither is needed, because we
know it already. Another way of putting it would be to say that simulations
can only deliver us results that fall within the deductive closure of our prior
knowledge.3
Therefore, if the term “empirical data” is understood as data of empirical
origin then computer simulations do not generate new empirical data. Some-
times the term “empirical” is used in a wider sense. Barberousse et al. [2009,
p. 560], for example, speak of the data that is generated by simulations as
data about empirical systems. But they, too, do not consider it to be new
data of empirical origin.
Another important difference is that some experiments operate directly
on the target system, while computer simulations never do. More precisely,
the kind of relation that subsists between the experimental object and the
target system is typically one of the following: identity, being an instance,
being a part. For example, if a car tester wants to know whether a car can
drive faster than 100 mph and, in order to find out, accelerates the car to
that speed then the object is identical with the target system. If physicists
want to know whether white light is composed of different colors, they can
let a beam of light fall through a prisma to find out. In this case the object
3Winsberg apparently holds a different view when, referring to a particular example, he
says: “To think it is true is to assume that anything you learn from a computer simulation
based on a theory of fluids is somehow already ‘contained’ in that theory. But to hold
this is to exaggerate the representational power of unarticulated theory. It is a mistake
to think of simulations as tools for unlocking hidden empirical content.” [Winsberg, 2010,
p. 54] While it is true that the presuppositions of a simulation are not only formed by
theories but by theories plus further modelling assumptions, there is no way around the
restriction that a simulation cannot deliver results that go beyond what is implied in
the presuppositions. In this sense simulations are indeed just tools for unlocking hidden
content.
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(a particular beam of light) is an instance of the target system (light). If
an archaeologist intends to determine the age of an old building and takes a
stone of that building to submit it to certain tests than the object is a part
of the target system.
There are also experiments that do not operate directly on the target
system. If one experiments with an electrical harmonic oscillator in order to
learn something about a mechanical oscillator [Hughes, 1999, p. 138], then
this experiment does not operate on the target system itself. But the fact
that some experiments operate on the target system or on an instance or a
part of the target system, suffices to set the two categories of experiment and
simulation apart. Because experiments can operate on the target system, the
experimental method has an epistemic reach beyond that of simulations.
As our case study below shows, there are also application cases where
simulations have an epistmic reach beyond that of experiments. However, in
this case the limitations of the experimental method are more a matter of
practical constraints, while in the opposite case there are principle reasons
why the epistemic reach of simulations cannot have the same extent as that
of experiments.
Finally, experiments can be used for the testing of fundamental hypothe-
ses (experimentum crucis), which, again, computer simulations cannot. It is
obvious that a simulation cannot be used to test fundamental hypotheses.
For, the outcome of the simulation would simply depend on the very hypoth-
esis upon which the simulation is built. It would be impossible to replace an
experimentum crucis like Young’s double-slit experiment that demonstrated
the wave nature of light by a simulation, because the results of the simulation
would merely reflect which of the competing theories was programmed into
the simulation.
Summing it up: Despite many striking similarities there are several fea-
tures of experiments that clearly set the experimental method apart from the
simulation method. This is true, even if in some cases simulations can act as
an surrogate for experiments. We will discuss one such case further below.
In the following we look at one concrete example case and examine under
what conditions simulations can serve as a surrogate or for experiments. The
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question has both an epistemological interest and practical relevance. It has
an epistemological interest, because it touches on the relation between theo-
retical reasoning, experimental testing and empirical observation in science.
The question has practical relevance, because it is important to understand
when one can trust the results of a simulation that is offered as a surrogate
for an experiment or measurement.4
3 Case Study: Simulation of H-2-Formation in
Outer Space
We examine the question under what preconditions a simulation can serve as
a substitute for an experiment with the example of a recently published sim-
ulation of H2-enrichment in outer space by Goumans & Kästner [2010]. This
example was chosen, because it fits quite well with the idea of an “experiment-
surrogate”. Also, it is simple enough to highlight the epistemologically im-
portant aspects. At the same time it is a case study from real science and
not merely a stylized example for didactic purposes.
3.1 Introductory Remarks on Simulations in Chemistry
One can safely say that by today computer simulations have a long standing
tradition in chemistry. The interest in chemical simulations is, among other
things like environmental considerations, motivated by the fact that simu-
lations allow to study details of chemical reactions that cannot be obtained
from experimental data or that are practically inaccessible by experiment
at all. But also when experiments are possible, simulations can be used to
double check the experimental results for their plausibility [Alexander et al.
, 2002, Wang et al. , 2008].
4This question aroused public attention in the aftermath of the eruption of the Iclandic
volcano Eyjafjallajökull in 2010, when airlines were ordered to stay on the ground on
the basis of simulation of the spreading of the volcanic ashes. This was criticized by
representatives of the airlines who claimed that computer simulations were an insufficient
basis for this decision [tag, 2010]. Similar questions are raised by environmental protection
policies justified by climate simulations.
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In our example of the simulation of H2-formation in outer space, the very
slow reaction rate renders the details of the reaction mechanism practically
inaccessible to experimental techniques [Goumans & Kästner, 2010, p. 7351].
This simulation can thus be considered as a stand in for an otherwise im-
possible experiment or as a surrogate simulation. A direct validation of the
simulation results is not possible in this case. Here, we speak of “direct vali-
dation” of a simulation when the same or almost the same process that has
been simulated has also been tracked empirically either by a) an experiment
of the same process under the same conditions or by b) observations in case
the same process occurs under the same conditions in nature and is directly
observable in nature.
However, consequences of the results, e.g. H2-enrichment in outer space,
can be compared to observational data [Goumans & Kästner, 2010, p. 7351f.].
Also, indirect forms of experimental validation are possible for some aspects
of the simulation and have indeed been applied (see section 3.4.3 on valida-
tion below). The simulations cannot rule out, though, that other mechanisms
than those predicted by the simulation may explain the observations. The
guiding question of our case study will be on what grounds we can consider
the simulation a proper experiment-surrogate if no direct validation is pos-
sible.5 In other words, where does this simulation get its credentials from or
why is it trustworthy?
Simulations in chemistry are based on physical theories. Different approx-
imations to those theories are used. The choice of the approximation depends
on the particular reaction that is simulated and on the level of detail and
accuracy that is desired as well as on the inevitable constraints in comput-
ing power. Two popular types of approximations can be distinguished. 1)
Molecular dynamics simulations are cheap in terms of computing power but
cannot describe changes in electronic structure, e.g. bond breaking and bond
5It should be noted that this question is different from that which is pursued by Barber-
ousse et al. [2009] whose criticism of the the physicality-argument to bracket simulations
and experiments is otherwise likeminded to our tenets. Barberousse et al. [2009] exam-
ine the semantic relation between simulations and their target system, which we take for
granted here, but do not ask the question of epistemic justification, which is our main
concern.
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formation. 2) Quantum mechanical simulations treat electrons in much de-
tail and, thus, allow to simulate breaking and formation of chemical bonds,
charge transfer, and electronic excitation. They require significantly higher
computational cost.
Our example belongs to the second category. Because the number
of atoms involved in the simulated reaction (H2-formation catalyzed by
chemisorption of H on benzene) is small enough, a quantum mechanical sim-
ulation of the reaction is feasible.
3.2 The Role of Quantum Mechanics as Comprehensive
Background Theory
In their daily work, theoretical chemists are not concerned with the physi-
cal theories upon which their simulations are based. They rather focus on
the design, selection, and justification of models, approximations, and al-
gorithms which allow to apply the background theory to specific chemical
reactions at an affordable computational cost and with sufficient accuracy.
Although the physical background theories are usually taken for granted
without further question, a few words on their epistemic role are in order,
because understanding the epistemic role that the background theories play
for these simulations is important for their philosophical justification.
It is an important condition for the kind of simulations that are done in
theoretical chemistry that they can rely on background theories that are well-
approved and uncontested within the range of application. We can speak of
theories that fulfill this condition as “comprehensive theories”. With compre-
hensive theories we mean theories that correctly describe all causally relevant
factors for a well-defined range of phenomena. Or, to put it in simpler words,
everything that happens within this range of phenomena happens according
to the theory. For such a theory to be well-approved and uncontested, three
conditions must hold:
1. The theory has been empirically confirmed in many important in-
stances.
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2. The theory has not been disconfirmed in any instances. If any anoma-
lies (i.e., contradictions of the theory with empirical facts and, thus,
possible candidates for falsification of the theory) have occurred, then
the sub-range of phenomena for which anomalies are to be expected
can at least clearly be delineated.
3. Any alternative theory (i.e., a different theory that fully or partly covers
the same range of phenomena) has identical consequences as the com-
prehensive theory within the overlap region of their respective ranges
of phenomena and within reasonable bounds of precision.
The theory of quantum mechanics meets these requirements for the de-
scription of chemical reactions. Anything that can happen in a chemical
reaction is – at least in principle – covered by quantum mechanics. Quantum
mechanics can be formulated in different ways. For example, the Schrödinger
picture is equivalent to the Heisenberg picture and to Feynman’s path integral
method [Jensen, 1998]. These formulations may be regarded as alternative
theories as defined above.
In principle, quantum electrodynamics, i.e. quantum mechanics in a for-
mulation which takes effects of the theory of special relativity into account,
should be more accurately used as the “comprehensive” background theory.
Then quantum mechanics can already be seen as the first approximation to
quantum electrodynamics. An even cruder approximation is to use molecu-
lar dynamics as a comprehensive theory for the behaviour of molecules. Its
accuracy may be sufficient in cases where no changes in the electronic struc-
ture occur. Thus, in these cases it may count as a comprehensive theory even
though it is not the most fundamental theory. The range of phenomena it
covers is then delineated by the non-occurrence of changes in the electronic
structure.
Slightly simplifying, one could also say that a theory is comprehensive for
a certain range of phenomena if we can safely expect it to produce results of
sufficient accuracy within this range of phenomena. It should be noted that
this is not circular, because we need to be sure beforehand (i.e. be able to
“safely expect”) that it produces results with sufficient accuracy. It should
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also be noted that the property of being comprehensive as we understand it
here is relational to particular classes or ranges of phenomena. Thus, when
speaking of a theory as being comprehensive in this sense we do not mean to
say that it is the most general theory about a certain subject matter in the
sense in which, say, the theory of relativity is the most general theory about
space, time and gravity.
Unfortunately, it is only some areas of some sciences where we really have
comprehensive theories. But if we do, it has important epistemological con-
sequences for the validation of models and simulations. Generally speaking,
the existence of a comprehensive theory increases the trustworthiness of our
models or simulations and it eases the burden of validation. For if a sim-
ulation is based on a comprehensive theory then the question whether the
simulation’s results are valid is reduced to the question whether the approxi-
mations and modelling techniques are passable. In case these can sufficiently
be justified theoretically, an additional empirical validation of the simulation
is not necessary any more, because we assume the theory to be correct and
to describe the phenomenon in question comprehensively.
Contrast this with the situation when there is no comprehensive theory.
In this case, even if we could justify all approximations and simulation tech-
niques theoretically, we would still need direct empirical validation.6 For,
unless our simulation was confirmed by empirical validation we would not
know whether the theoretical assumptions about the simulated phenomena
hold true in a particular application case or not.
This situation frequently occurs, for example, in agent-based simulations
in economics and other social sciences. Agent-based simulations cannot rely
on any uncontested theory, because, typically, there exists either no theory
at all for the phenomena simulated by agent-based simulations, in which case
these simulations must rely on ad-hoc assumptions. Or there exist different
and competing theories, in which case it is hard to justify the choice of a
particular one of them without direct validation. Or the theories, like utility
theory, are too sparse and have too little content to serve as a comprehensive
6By direct validation we mean validation of the simulation set-up with an experiment
that closely mimics the simulation set-up.
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theory. The contrast that exists between economic theory and physics in
this respect is often overlooked, but it has been pointed out very clearly in
Cartwright [2009, p. 48/49]. It is all the more unfortunate, therefore, that
proper validation is not yet common practice in the field of agent-based-
simulations [Heath et al. , 2009].
In science and engineering the favorable case occurs more often in which
an uncontested and well-approved background theory does indeed exist. For
example, simulations of chemical processes such as the H2-formation simu-
lation described below can rely on quantum mechanics as a comprehensive
theory. As we shall see, this greatly reduces the need for direct empirical val-
idation of their results and makes it possible to employ them as experiment
surrogates.
3.3 The Motivation for Simulating the H-2-Formation
in Outer Space
The simulation of H2-formation in outer space described in the following
is documented in Goumans & Kästner [2010]. The purpose of this simula-
tion is to contribute to the explanation of H2-enrichment in the interstellar
medium. The simulation can best be described as a piece in the puzzle to
explain this phenomenon. The point where the simulation study picks up the
problem is defined by a number of previously established facts and existing
astrochemical hypotheses:
1. It has been measured in astronomy that H2 is abundant in the in-
terstellar medium “despite inefficient gas-phase formation routes and
H2-destruction by cosmic rays and photons.” [Goumans & Kästner,
2010, p. 7350]
2. To explain this fact, otherH2-formation routes must exist. One possible
route is the chemisorption of hydrogen atoms (H) on dust grains made
mostly of carbon [Cazaux et al. , 2008]. “Astrochemical models require
facile chemisorption of H on carbonaceous dust grains at intermediate
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temperatures” [Goumans & Kästner, 2010, p. 7350]. Intermediate tem-
peratures are temperatures approximately between 100 K and 250 K.
Such dust grains mainly consist of graphite and its smaller fragments,
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons.
3. Is has been suggested that theH2-formation rates must exceed 3×10−17
or 2 × 10−16 cm3molecule−1s−1. [Habart et al. , 2004] (The rate is
specified relative to the concentration of dust molecules which catalyse
the process.)
4. The chemisorption of the first hydrogen atom to an aromatic hydrocar-
bon determines the rate. The addition of the second hydrogen atom is
known to be much faster [Hornekaer et al. , 2006].
5. Hydrogen exists in the form of two stable isotopes, the lighter protium
(1H) and the heavier deuterium (2H or D). Observations show that D is
much more abundant in atomic hydrogen than in molecular hydrogen
(H2 vs. HD) [Cazaux et al. , 2008]. This suggests that atom tunneling
is involved in the formation of H2 because deuterium tunnels less effi-
ciently than protium due to its higher mass. “D2 has not been observed
to date [in photon dominated regions].” [Cazaux et al. , 2008, p. 496]
The question that Goumans & Kästner [2010] seek to answer is whether
chemisorption of H and D atoms to polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (as a
model for dust grains consisting of carbon), and in particular the tunneling
effect, can account for theH2-enrichment in the interstellar medium. In order
to answer this question the reaction rates of the chemisorption of H and D
on benzene, the simple-most aromatic hydrocarbon, need to be determined.
The reaction rates of the chemisorption of H and D on benzene can be deter-
mined experimentally only for temperatures that are much higher than those
in in the interestellar medium in outer space. Therefore, the experimental
determination of the reaction rate must be surrogated by numerical calcula-
tion. In the given low temperature setting the reaction rates depend crucially
on the tunnel effect. If the tunneling rates can be brought into agreement
with the observations and suggestions listed above, then this supports both
14
the assumption that H2-formation in outer space is catalyzed by polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons and that the tunneling effect plays a crucial role in
this reaction.
In principle, the tunneling effect can also be observed experimentally, but
practically this is well-nigh impossible in the given scenario, because the reac-
tion rates are too low for experimental purposes due to the low temperatures
[Goumans & Kästner, 2010, p. 7351]. The time scales relevant to the inter-
stellar medium (105 years) can not even closely be reached in experiments.
The more welcome therefore is the possibility to simulate this reaction in the
computer. At the same time, because no direct experimental validation of
the simulation is available, more strain is put on the justification of the the-
oretical and technical ingredients of this simulation which will be described
in the following.
3.4 Modeling Techniques and their Credentials
Having seen what motivates the use for a computer simulation in outer space,
we now describe in more detail, the abstractions that this computer simula-
tion relies on and the modeling techniques it makes use of and how both of
these are justified.
3.4.1 Abstractions
First of all, the simulation uses a simplified model to capture the essence
of the chemical reaction that is considered to be most relevant for H2-
enrichment in outer space, namely the chemisorption of H and D on ben-
zene. Benzene is the simplest aromatic hydrocarbon and it is expected that
the results of the simulation regarding the reaction rate under consideration
and the tunneling effect will not fundamentally differ for other polycyclic
aromatic hydrocarbons, an assumption meanwhile confirmed by additional
simulations [Goumans, 2011].
Furthermore, only the first part of the reaction, namely the chemisorption
of H or D on benzene, is simulated but not the addition of the second H
or D which would complete the formation of the H2, HD, or D2 . The
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rationale for this abstraction lies in the fact that the “addition of a second
H or D atom is barrier-less para to a chemisorbed H . . . on the edge of a
polyaromatic hydrocarbon” [Goumans & Kästner, 2010, p. 7351], wherefore
it is the chemisorption of the first H atom that is rate-limiting.
3.4.2 Modeling Techniques
The H-tunneling simulation makes use of a number of approximations and
modeling techniques within the realm of quantum mechanics. To describe
the atomic motion, it uses instanton theory (also called harmonic quantum
transition state theory, HQTST) which is an approximation to quantum me-
chanics. Its approximations are mathematically well defined, and it has been
applied for decades to calculate tunneling rates [Takatsuka et al. , 1999,
Va˘ınshte˘ın et al. , 1982]. “This approach has been shown to be quite accu-
rate in comparison to analytic solutions and results from quantum dynamics,
especially low temperatures where other semi-classical tunneling approaches
often underestimate transmission coefficients” [Goumans & Kästner, 2010, p.
7350]. Instanton theory is based on (an approximation to) Feynman’s path
integral method.
The electronic motion in turn was described by density functional the-
ory, a different formulation of quantum mechanics. The theory itself is exact
[Hohenberg & Kohn, 1964], but the functional involved is unknown and has
to be approximated. Goumans & Kästner [2010] performed reference calcu-
lations with the CCSD(T)/CBS ab-initio method, another approximation to
the exact quantum mechanical result with well established accuracy. Then
they compared different forms of functionals, all of which are frequently used
and were empirically found to be credible in many cases in chemistry. They
used the MPWB1K functional for the simulation since it provided a satisfac-
torily good match to the CCSD(T)/CBS reference data, and because it was
at the same time the relatively best match in comparison to several other
tested functionals.
In all quantum chemical simulations, the quantum mechanical wave func-
tion has to be expanded in a finite basis set. The error introduced by this
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expansion is already accounted for in the comparison of the functionals, be-
cause CCSD(T)/CBS does not show this error (CBS stands for complete
basis set limit).
The computer programs used by Goumans & Kästner [2010] (NWChem,
ChemShell, Gaussian, Molpro) are well established and used by many re-
searchers throughout the world. Significant errors would likely have been
found prior to their study and can, thus, be regarded as very unlikely. The
program implementing the instanton theory was partially written specifically
for the one study presented here. Before the production calculations, it was
tested extensively against cases with known results. This is in line with the
established best practices in the field and will usually not even be mentioned
in the scientific papers.
Additional approximations, like the truncation of a number series or con-
vergence criteria, were tested by extending them and monitoring the change
of the result. The used values are reported to allow the exact reproduction
of the calculations by other scientists.
Summing it up, in order to realize the simulation, the authors made use of
a number of modeling techniques, including several levels of approximations.
While one could say that this inevitably introduces some degree “motleyness”
and “autonomy” [Winsberg, 2001], these characterizations are not very fitting
in this particular example, because the simulation discussed here is diligently
built to reflect the theory as closely as possible and does not draw on any in-
dependent phenomenological considerations. Also, many techniques are used
to keep deviations from the theory in check, like the comparison of different
functionals with reference calculations as well as various measures of testing
and error checking. Ultimately, when interpreting the results it is taken into
account that the simulation results may – due to the employed functional –
deviate from the real values in a certain way: “Since the functional we used
overestimates the classical barrier, the real rates [of H2 formation] will be
higher than our calculated ones.”[Goumans & Kästner, 2010, p. 7352]
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3.4.3 Validation
The tunneling rates calculated by Goumans & Kästner cannot, at least with
the techniques currently available, directly be tested by experiment. Thus,
they serve as real theoretical predictions. Limiting or similar cases, can be
validated, though.
The approximations used can be divided into two classes: (1) instanton
theory as an approximation to full quantum mechanics. (2) Density func-
tional theory, the basis set, and the computer codes involved to describe the
potential energy surface. The latter is needed as input to instanton theory.
Instanton theory, as mentioned above, was shown previously (by other
scientists) to be accurate in a broad class of chemical reactions. Thus, the
authors assume that it is also accurate enough for the chemisorption of hy-
drogen on benzene.
The rate of the chemisorption of hydrogen on benzene was measured ex-
perimentally at higher temperature than relevant for the interstellar medium
(300–600 K). In this temperature interval, tunneling does not play a role,
which facilitates the simulation of rates. Goumans & Kästner therefore were
able to use the computationally expensive CCSD(T)/CBS method to cal-
culate the rate in this temperature interval. They compared it to the ex-
perimental values [Goumans & Kästner, 2010, Figure S2 of the Supporting
Information] and found satisfactory agreement. Additionally, they calcu-
late the rate with a number of density functionals, and found again satis-
factory agreement with the MPWB1K functional. The rate at these high
temperatures (300–600 K) depends only on a small part of the potential
energy surface. The part is crucial for the tunneling rate at low tempera-
tures as well, though. Then they calculated the potential energy surface at
the whole tunneling path both with the CCSD(T)/CBS reference method
and the MPWB1K functional used for the tunneling rates. The agreement
between these surfaces adds credibility to the tunneling simulations.
Thus, although direct empirical validation was impossible for this simu-




The main conclusions drawn by Goumans & Kästner were the suggestion that
“H atoms could chemisorb on PAHs in the moderately warm (100–200 K)
regions of the interstellar medium, contributing to the catalytic formation of
H2” and that “D will chemisorb an order of magnitude slower [than protium]”
[Goumans & Kästner, 2010, p. 7352]. A conclusion given more implicitly
was that the reaction would be too slow were it not for the tunneling process
which accelerates the reaction by many orders of magnitude (depending on
the temperature). Thus, when drawing conclusions the simulation results are
treated like experimental results by the authors. The simulation here acts as
a stand-in for an otherwise impossible experiment.
Not surprisingly, the simulation of the H-chemisorption on benzene shows
many characteristics that make it appear experiment-like: Just like an ex-
periment, the calculations provide numbers which have to be post-processed
in order to obtain rates, and interpreted in order to draw conclusions. The
simulation also mimics an experiment with respect to its function of hypoth-
esis confirmation. For, the “computer experiment” could either confirm or
falsify the hypothesis that tunneling contributes to H2-formation in space.
In the end it confirmed the hypothesis.
The process of designing or setting up the simulation also exposes analo-
gies to experiments. While in a material experiment, the techniques of mea-
surements have to be chosen adequately, in the simulation various approxi-
mations have to be chosen adequately. A wrong choice will result in wrong
results, generally, however, no results at all, in either case. Errors in these
choices can in both cases be identified by reproducing the experiment or the
simulation with different parameters.
And like an experiment the simulation can be replicated. In the case of
computer simulations replication means: Reimplementing the same simula-
tion under different conditions, like, for example, under a different system
environment, with different but functionally equivalent software frameworks
and libraries, with different but equally well motivated approximations or
with different functionals that have a comparable reliability for the prob-
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lem at hand. Just like the replication of an experiment the replication of a
simulation serves the purpose of reassuring the researchers that the obtained
results were not merely an artifact of the idiosyncrasies of a particular set-up.
Speaking of the relation between simulations and experiments in general,
we have noted earlier that there are not only many striking similarities be-
tween simulations and experiments but also some important differences (see
section 2.2 above). Whether a simulation can be considered as experiment-
like on the phenomenological level and, beyond that, as a viable experiment-
surrogate on the epistemological level, does also depend on how relevant these
differences are in a particular case.
For our example of the H-tunneling simulation we can safely draw the
conclusion that the fact that the simulation is not a material experiment and
does not operate directly on the target system or generate any new empiri-
cal data, does not matter in this case, because the problem of determining
the H-tunneling rates can be decided by theory alone, and does not require
collecting new empirical data. Of course it must be taken for granted that
the theory is true.
An experiment could – at least conceivably – also reveal that quantum
theory is false or, say, not valid in outer space. Such an accidental finding (in
an experiment that was not intended to test the theory) is impossible with
a computer simulation. But given how very well tested quantum mechanics
is, this seems extremely unlikely to occur in any such experiment and one
would surely first take the possibility of all sorts of experimental error into
account, before starting to doubt quantum mechanics.
Thus, in the example of our case-study, materiality is not really an issue
and we can therefore consider the simulation not only as experiment-like in
virtue of its many similarities to experimental procedures, but also as an
experiment-surrogate in the stronger epistemological sense as well. Its epis-
temic reliability ultimately rests on the confidence in quantum mechanics as
a comprehensive background theory. Because the simulated phenomena are
completely covered by quantum mechanics we can be sure that no causal
factors will be missed out by basing the simulation exclusively on quantum
mechanics. Apart from quantum mechanics the epistemic reliability depends
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also on the credibility of the justifications for the approximations and mod-
eling techniques employed in the simulation. This, again, does not require
materiality. Therefore it would be safe to label this simulation a “computer
experiment” without running the danger of exaggerating its epistemic relia-
bility.
4 Summary and Conclusions
As our case-study shows, computer simulations can in many respects be
compared to experiments. Yet, as we argued earlier, being comparable to
experiments does not mean that computer simulations are experiments. But
it seems promising to pursue the question under what conditions a com-
puter simulation can act as substitute for an experiment and what kind of
research design a simulation of phenomena that are not directly accessible
by experiment must follow.
From our case study we can learn that there is a good chance for employ-
ing simulations as an experiment-surrogate if the investigated phenomena
fall in the realm of a comprehensive theory, i.e. a tried and tested theory
that fully covers the phenomena that are simulated. If this is the case then
the question of validating the simulation is reduced to justifying the em-
ployed modeling techniques and approximations which does not necessarily
require empirical validation. The underlying research design of such simula-
tions could roughly be described as “comprehensive theory plus well-approved
modeling techniques”. This research design appears to be a valid research
design for experiment-surrogate simulations.
Here, we consider a research design as valid when, if executed properly,
it has the chance of generating reliable scientific knowledge. In contrast, a
research design is invalid or “broken” or “unsound” if, even when properly
followed, it cannot generate reliable scientific knowledge about the investi-
gated subject matter. It is important to understand that even if the research
design is valid a particular research project can still fail, namely, if one or
more of the required steps have not been executed properly. On the other
hand, if the research design itself is unsound, any research project following
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it will inevitably fail.
We conjecture that the same research design and therefore the same epis-
temic justification also underlies many other examples of simulation research
in the natural sciences. A salient candidate for future investigation would
be QM/MM simulations in chemistry. The situation in the case of QM/MM
simulations is slightly more complicated than in our case, because QM/MM
simulations make use of two background theories, molecular mechanics and
quantum mechanics and introduce coupling terms to bridge the molecular
mechanics and quantum mechanics part [Senn & Thiel, 2009]. This raises
the question if our idea of a “comprehensive theory” can still be applied to
describe the research logic of such simulations or if it needs to be adjusted.
Simulations in astronomy that, like simulations of the collision of galax-
ies, cannot directly be validated by observation might also be an example for
a similar kind of research logic and epistemic justification. But they prob-
ably introduce a further problem that did not play a prominent role in our
example. Our example was a simulation of a reaction of benzene and hydro-
gen. The structure and the properties of the involved molecules and chemical
elements are very well known. But can the same be said of the initial data
from which simulations in astronomy start? And, if not, what would be the
consequences for their epistemological assessment?
A question that has not been touched in this paper is how simulations that
do not or cannot rely on comprehensive theories at all get their credentials.
One could say that a comprehensive theory and well-approved modeling tech-
niques jointly form a sufficient condition for a proper experiment-surrogate.
But does that also mean that being able to rely on a “comprehensive the-
ory” is a necessary condition? While we have not investigated and therefore
cannot exclude the possibility that there are other valid research designs for
experiment-surrogate simulations, it appears to us that it would probably
be much harder to establish the credibility of an experiment-surrogate sim-
ulation of phenomena that are not covered by a comprehensive theory. At
least it is difficult to imagine how in this situation an experiment-surrogate
simulation could claim credibility without direct empirical validation. For,
how were we to know without direct empirical validation that our simulation
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did not omit one or more relevant causal factors?
However, this is just a conjecture and we do not want to dogmatically
exclude the possibility of valid research designs for experiment-surrogate sim-
ulations that do not rely on a comprehensive theory. It would indeed be un-
fortunate, if there weren’t any, because, except for the exact natural sciences
and their technological application fields, there are only few areas of science
where we can rely on comprehensive theories.
But for the same reason a healthy amount of skepticism is also advisable
when the use of numerical methods in the humanities is justified by reference
to their success in the exact natural sciences – as it is sometimes done by
those schools in the social sciences that try to repeat the success of the nat-
ural sciences by imitating their methods [Shapiro, 2005]. Successful research
designs can only be transferred from one science to another if the conditions
for their applicability have been properly understood. By presenting a case-
study from theoretical chemistry we hope to have made a contribution to the
better understanding of a particular kind of simulation research design for
simulations that act as substitute for experiments.
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